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Policy decisions, practically defined for this paper as commitments to
become dependent on the outcomes of longer-term and consequential
relationships to chosen projects (rather than their perceived alternatives),
are at the heart of politics, business, finance, health, defense, security, and
our evolving physical environment. This is a paper about the current
thinking informing policy making in this sense: what it takes for granted,
its consequences, and what to do about it.
We start from the position that theories—and thus the research
grounding them—affect policy making.2 Policy makers tend to develop
theories based not only on actual or anticipated social interaction, but
also on (often-implicit) causal explanatory models of the world. Even
when they are not aware of them, these models inform their perception
of the situation at hand (Thomas 1923). Such models are encountered
either directly, such as in business schools and university economics
departments, or indirectly, as through the training of the decision
makers’ advisers.
Our second position is that many political decision makers have been
relying, without sufficient examination, on advice based on standard
economic models that have dominated decision science since the Second
World War. The key feature of these standard models is that they are
both idealized and “idealistic” (Katsikopoulos 2014). They are idealized
or unrealistic because they tend not to be supported by actual
observations of how reasonable people make decisions in real-world
settings and are usually divorced from the uncertainty and complexity of
implementation. The models are sometimes informed by data produced
in laboratory experiments, but what makes them unrealistic is less the fact
that the data are about artificial decision making settings with little at
stake than that the data are processed via assumptions that treat people as
always in a position to make unique optimal decisions, subject to any
particular constraints which they may face. Such actors are effectively
omniscient. They are given no scope either to suffer the problems of
deciding how to interpret available information or to have doubts as to
which model of the ways the world works they should best apply.
Further, the models are “idealistic” because they represent agents who
make decisions according to normative ideals regarding the role pure
reason, logic, and objectivity should be expected to play in thinking and
deciding. These normative “ideals” are grounded in a very narrow
interpretation of rational thought, essentially limited to internal logical
consistency, which excludes induction, creativity, imagination, and
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constructive emotions. Further, agents tend to be conceived as atomistic
and thus as unaware of and unaffected by each other, except perhaps
indirectly, through the anonymous decisions that lead to a certain price
at a certain time.
There is nothing particularly “economic” about such an asocial
conception of agency. Adam Smith, for example, thought that the
desire to be “well regarded” was essential to understanding action, while
David Hume thought that we act so as to satisfy our emotions. However,
in contrast to Smith and Hume, contemporary economics—and even the
cognitive psychology that is being used to amend contemporary
economics—perpetuate an idealistic conception of agency.
The deficiency of these models became clear during the 2008 financial
crisis. As the then-president of the European Central Bank, Jean-Claude
Trichet (2010), put it:
When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and
financial models immediately became apparent. Arbitrage broke down
in many market segments, as markets froze and market participants were
gripped by panic. Macro models failed to predict the crisis and seemed
incapable of explaining what was happening to the economy in a
convincing manner. . . . As a policy-maker during the crisis, I found the
available models of limited help. In fact, I would go further: in the face
of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools.
Trichet was not alone in this view. The crisis should have sparked, in its
turn, an intellectual crisis concerning the validity of policy advice.
We hope to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the
financial crisis for rethinking decision-making models. We will sketch
where, how, and why “idealistic” models failed (and why they are likely
to continue to fail). We will also discuss possible research directions—
such as the new opportunities presented by digital data and analytics—to
create more realistic and effective models.
I. IDEALISTIC MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
Models of decision making tend to postulate one of two types of agents.
The first, the idealistically conceived agent of standard neoclassical
economics, uses the complete set of information that is available about
any given decision in an optimal way; or, in situations in which the agent
lacks complete information, he or she still makes the optimal decisions
Tuckett et al. • Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making 3
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subject to this constraint (and other constraints such as inadequate
resources or the behavior of others, as in Cournot-Nash equilibria). The
second type of agent is the irrational agent conceived of by modern
behavioral economics, who frequently deviates from making optimal
decisions because of biases and framing errors.
Neoclassical Economics
Economics is essentially a theory of how agents choose amongst
alternative options in any given situation. Like any theory, it makes
assumptions that simplify reality. A simplification need not be unrealistic.
The question, rather, is: To what extent are the assumptions reasonable
approximations of the real world?
In standard neoclassical3 economics agents are treated as if they know
the model that correctly describes the behavior of the system in which
they operate. Their goals are defined by the maximization of their
expected utility and it is assumed that the information relevant to
achieving a goal is available or can be axiomatically inferred. This view
has no room for most of the real-world problems of uncertainty, conflict,
and imperfect implementation that a typical policy maker may experi-
ence as relevant to his decision.
In addition to the assumption that agents are aware of the correct
model, neoclassical economics contains several other unrealistic assump-
tions that can be gleaned from any mainstream textbook (e.g., Mankiw
1997). First, crucially, it is assumed that the agent—a person, firm, or
government—has a set of stable preferences across the range of
alternatives. In fact, the precise, formal assumption is much more
demanding than this. The agent is assumed to have a set of preferences
that are complete over all possible alternatives. However, even in its more
relaxed, purely descriptive form, the assumption of stable preferences
implies that agents’ preferences do not change over time and, thus, that
agents cannot and do not learn what they desire from experience.
A second key assumption is that an agent is not influenced directly by
other people’s decisions. This is, naturally, a peculiar assumption for any
policy maker to sustain in the interconnected media-hungry world of the
twenty-first century.4
A third assumption is that the agent has the computational capacity to
gather and process all relevant information not only about the goods and
services he sees, but about unseen alternatives. In the more general
4 Critical Review
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version, which acknowledges the existence of imperfect information
amongst some or even all agents, there may be costs to cognition (the
cost of gathering information and maybe of processing it). However, it
still retains the principle that an agent is trying to optimize his actions,
subject to the cost constraints. Therefore, if the agent is free of bias,
among the options he can compute he will choose the one that
maximizes utility. Thus, for example, in forming expectations about the
future, over time these expectations will on average prove to be correct.
They may not necessarily be correct in every single period. But the agent
is presumed to be using the correct model of the system with which to
form his expectations. Any errors that might emerge are therefore purely
random, and will cancel each other out over time. On average, then,
over an unspecified but long period of time, the expectations will prove
correct. Since only firms that maximize utility will survive in a
competitive context, it can be assumed that every firm that matters will
make the right decision (Azar 2006). Conversely, consumers who make
non-optimal decisions do not disappear, but they may experience lower
levels of utility than they could actually get.
The ultimate expression of mainstream economic theory, based on
these assumptions, is general-equilibrium theory. (The importance of
general-equilibrium theory in economics is suggested by the fact that no
fewer than seven out of the first eleven winners of the Nobel Prize in
economics received it for their work on general equilibrium.) Its main
contribution is to define a mathematical framework within which it can
be shown that the individualistic optimizing behavior of economic agents
can be coordinated on an equilibrium, provided that the public price
signals are correct. Equilibrium is not to be understood here as the rest
point of a dynamic system, as is standard in the natural sciences, but as an
economic state in which supply and demand are balanced in every
market such that there are no unused resources. In particular, if the
market is at equilibrium, then any remaining unemployment cannot be
said to be due to the deficiencies of the market; rather, according to the
theory of general equilibrium, it means that the unemployed have
rationally chosen not to work.5
General-equilibrium theory exercises a powerful influence on the
policy recommendations made by economists. “Computable” general-
equilibrium models are calibrated to specific circumstances, but the
concept of general equilibrium has a wider reach. For example, in the
past few decades the dominant trend within macroeconomics has been to
Tuckett et al. • Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making 5
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produce Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.6
These models are intended to help economic policy makers choose
between options (as mentioned by Trichet). Although DSGE models are
highly intricate and mathematical, they tend to rest on the incredible
assumption that the whole behavior of a modern capitalist economy at
the macro level can be modeled as the actions of a single agent—the
“representative” agent. In the case of unemployment, the representative
macro agent is thought to have made an optimal choice to consume
leisure time instead of working. Naturally, since they contain only one
agent, these models are unable to distinguish, for example, between the
behavior of debtors and of creditors. One can readily see that in a
financial crisis these models would be hard to apply and may have played
a role in making the crisis hard to foresee (Ormerod 2010). Subsequent
to the crisis, the models have been expanded to allow more than one
agent, but they retain their other fundamental assumptions about
unrealistic optimization.
Olivier Blanchard, chief economist at the International Monetary
Fund, eulogized DSGE models in an MIT working paper published just
three weeks before the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
Blanchard (2008, 24) wrote that “DSGE models have become ubiquit-
ous. Dozens of teams of researchers are involved in their construction.
Nearly every central bank has one, or wants to have one. They are used
to evaluate policy rules, to do conditional forecasting, or even sometimes
to do actual forecasting.” He concluded his paper with the claim that
“the state of macroeconomics is good.” Despite the crisis, DSGE models
continue to be influential and pervasive, particularly in policy analysis
rather than pure short-term forecasting. For example, the website of the
European Central Bank carries a description of its DSGE model. Dotsey
2013 describes its use in monetary policy by the Federal Reserve. Del
Negro et al. 2013 describes the DSGE model of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York and “how the model works, how it is estimated,
how it rationalizes past history, including the Great Recession, and how
it is used for forecasting and policy analysis.”
Behavioral Economics and Psychology
The central assumptions about how to model agents model in economics
today are also the main assumptions in dominant approaches to modeling
decision making in psychology. They are inspired by the same vision of
6 Critical Review
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the ideal, unboundedly rational creature postulated in neoclassical
economics: Someone living in a world where he can consistently
know not only what he wants but how to get it. A typical example is
a choice among risky gambles. The decision maker is presumed to know
all possible outcomes of each gamble, to assign a numerical utility to each
outcome, to know the probability with which each outcome will occur,
and finally to calculate the expected utility of each gamble so that she
chooses a gamble that obtains the maximum profit.
The choices of an expected utility optimizer can be represented by the
logical axioms jointly equivalent to expected utility theory (von
Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). One type of axiom is that of
transitivity, where for all gambles x, y, and z, if x is chosen over y and
y is chosen over z, then x is chosen over z. Although sometimes
transitivity and similar axioms are thought to have merely normative
status such that a decision maker should satisfy them (Savage 1954;
Wakker and Tversky 1993), they are generally viewed as empirical
descriptions. The same kinds of axioms are the building blocks of the
idealistic culture of modeling in psychology and in behavioral economics
as well. A researcher can generate new models of bounded rationality by
retaining some axioms of unbounded rationality, taking out others, and
proposing new ones. For example, Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky’s prospect theory always satisfies transitivity but may violate
the axiom of independence, where for all gambles x, y, and z and
probabilities p, if x is chosen over y, then the compound gamble (x, p; z,
1—p) is chosen over (y, p; z, 1—p) (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Thus,
the prospect theory decision maker is only slightly less idealized than her
expected-utility ancestor.
In sum, idealistic models in psychology and behavioral economics
tend to have three particular features: (1) they refer to decisions made in
an imagined context where real uncertainty about what might happen in
future is limited or quantified to what is usually thought of as risk (e.g.,
gambles where the probabilities of outcomes over a series of trials are
known), not decisions under uncertainty (where the probabilities are not
known); (2) they are not concerned with how decision makers make
sense of or interpret a given “decision problem” (e.g., how people would
come to frame a situation as a choice between risky gambles); and (3)
they tend to neglect the role of non-cognitive factors, such as
motivation, intuition, and emotion—or when these are referred to,
they are seen as factors that upset optimal decision making.
Tuckett et al. • Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making 7
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More generally, idealistic decision models in psychology and behavioral
economics often take as their point of departure mathematical facts, such as
axioms and principles, rather than empirical findings. This may sound odd
given that behavioral economists try to examine behavior experimentally.
But empirical facts are not the sole—or in some cases even the primary—
inspiration or justification for the development of idealistic models. For
example, a key assumption of cumulative prospect theory—that people
weigh probabilities nonlinearly—was inspired by the empirical fact that
people’s attitudes toward risk depend on whether they expect to gain or
lose and on their estimated probability of the size of the gains or losses
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992). But in addition to this empirical fact, the
assumption that people weight probabilities was influenced by the general
mathematical formula that utility is multiplied by probability, a common
formulation in idealistic models. Although this assumption is not necessary
to explain empirical behavior, as shown by other models that do not
incorporate the assumption (Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer 2008), some
practitioners of behavioral economics think its empirical basis is firm
enough that they advocate it as a prescriptive approach to how people
should make decisions. The story goes as follows (Katsikopoulos 2014):
People are systematically behaving irrationally, but because they are in
principle able to figure out how to behave rationally, they should keep
trying to do so. Interestingly, however, the proponents of the idealistic
approach do not believe that people can actually learn to behave
“rationally” (Bond 2009).
It is clear that those who buy this story will end up as frustrated as
Tantalus ever was. This frustration is bound to lead to one of two
dysfunctional responses: one can either deny, as neoclassical economists
do, that people make bad decisions; or one can acknowledge, as
behavioral economists tend to do, that people sometimes make disastrous
decisions and recommend that they should therefore surrender to the
designs of somebody smarter (who one hopes is also well meaning). The
latter impetus is seen in the recent push for changing not the decision
maker but the context in which decisions take place—“nudging,”
encouraging, or forcing people to make the “right” decisions (Sunstein
and Thaler 2008) by altering the choice architecture within which
options are presented. This paternalism (libertarian or otherwise) makes
sense only if the nudgers or enforcers know both what is wanted and the
best way to achieve it. It also depends on the assumption that real-world
decisions will be similar to the decisions made in laboratory experiments,
8 Critical Review
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where enough necessary information is available to the participants that
they can, in principle, make the “right” decision.
The Problems
A great deal of effort has gone into research on decision making. But as a
spokesperson for the UK Cabinet Office recently noted, “the products of
the research community are largely not relevant to our needs” (quoted in
Rees and Whitaker 2014). This is not because the models are too simple.
Models must simplify. Rather the problem is that idealistic modeling
focuses on the wrong kinds of decisions (for example, on gambles where
there is a well-defined answer) in the wrong contexts (in which
interpretation and model uncertainty are off limits) with the wrong
(i.e., idealized) agents. In particular, idealistic modeling has little or
nothing to say about how, faced with a real situation with uncertainty
about whether some means will produce a given end, an agent can
optimize her utility.
It is unsurprising that, in consequence, for most policy-relevant
contexts, the conclusions of such modeling are often misleading for
several reasons. The first problem is that idealistic modeling always
assumes a context where it is possible to calculate the best decision at any
point in time. The investigators know the best decision, after all—or so
they assume! This implies that laboratory decision makers have a level of
knowledge about future outcomes and knowledge about how to obtain
what they want that is quite impossible to imagine in most real-world
policy contexts. More usually policy makers and those they seek to
influence are faced with ontological uncertainty (Giddens 1991; Lane and
Maxfield 2005): They are often uncertain about the validity of their own
beliefs about what will happen. Likewise, policy makers are uncertain (or
should be uncertain) which policies will or will not be effective. In such
situations, the actors are not necessarily making framing errors or biasing
their decisions away from the “right” one. They just can’t know what it
would be best to do. Ontological elements (objects and the connections
between them) are themselves hard to grasp, rendering uncertain which
frame is the “correct” one, which decision the “right” one, or even the
range for which probabilities might be assigned. Ignoring the dangers of
assuming that we know more than we do has been disastrous. As John
Kay (2011, 173) puts it, “It is hard to overstate the damage done in the
Tuckett et al. • Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making 9
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recent past by people who thought they knew more about the world
than they really did.”
A second, related source of difficulty is that idealistic modeling ignores
the need for interpretation and for the management of irreducible
conflicts between competing means to the same end. Most decisions of
this sort depend on information that is not just incomplete but hard to
judge in and of itself. Interpretations can also change. No matter how
many facts one knows about a given economy or about climate change,
the significance of an economic or climatic problem, its causes, whether
they can be ameliorated, and if so, by what means are all open to
reasonable question.
A third source of difficulty concerns the poverty of the idealized
conception of a decision-making agent. If decision making is seen to
require merely the optimization of large volumes of available informa-
tion, without any need to interpret the data, then the best decision
maker will be an isolated computer or programmed robot that has no use
for the many evolved human capabilities that assist interpretation and
action—such as inference, emotion, imitation or narrative, or more
generally the capacity for social interaction, trust, and social influence—
which, on the idealized view, may even put human beings at a
disadvantage. New developments in neuroscience and psychology,
however, suggest that the traditional view of emotion and reason as
antagonistic is mistaken and that in general, cognition is grounded in the
body, such that emotional reactions (ultimately registered in various
brain areas) play a vital role in perception, interpretation, simulation, and
judgment, making action under uncertainty possible (Barsalou 2008;
Blanchette and Richards 2010; Clark 1997; Damasio 1999; Edelman
2004; Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Tuckett 2011).
An implicit premise of dominant economic models is that the future
will resemble the past. This may be true in routine situations. However,
as Herbert Simon (1978) pointed out, “two generations of economic
theorists” have grown a vast garden of formal and technical problems
that rely on the assumption that the future will be like the past, and in so
doing they have “postponed encounters with the inelegancies of the real
world.” Real-life decision makers have to imagine futures and figure out
to what extent the future will be similar to the past. They suffer from an
excess of information that might be relevant to predicting the future and
they suffer from massive uncertainty about which aspects of this
information to attend to, to treat as reliable, and to weigh as likely to
10 Critical Review
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be useful and relevant to their task, which is to work out how things
done now will evolve in the future.
Idealistic models work only in ideal contexts, where it is reasonable to
suppose the information currently available is not only all the informa-
tion one needs, but that it also has a single correct interpretation. As
Michael Woodford (2011) points out, even if a modeler chooses the
model that he believes to be the most appropriate one and assumes that
the agents in his model behave “rationally,” he has no reason to believe
that the real agents in question would choose the same model and thus
share his expectations. Insofar as the modern world creates challenges
that are complex rather than routine (Malleret 2012), the “idealistic”
approaches just described seem to us not only to be of very limited value
but also to be dangerous. They have a tendency to provoke “paralysis by
analysis” and either helplessness or hubris in the face of uncertainty.
Thus, in the past seven decades, the decision-making models that have
been produced have been mostly unhelpful since they have been
dominated by idealistic modeling of questionable relevance. What we
need are not more modeling resources but better theoretical frameworks
to understand choices made under uncertainty.
II. NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW FRAMEWORKS, AND
NEW APPROACHES
The standard idealistic approaches we have been reviewing are not the
only ones to have been developed. More promising approaches have
existed for some time.7 However, they have failed to gain traction or
attention in the academic community. In this part of the paper we want,
first, to argue that it is important to develop a much more pragmatic and
less mathematically axiomatic science of decision making supported by
empirical research in relevant contexts; and, second, to describe some
recent cutting-edge approaches to doing just that.
We suggest that the following principles should guide future research
efforts:
1. Theories should be clearly supported by the study of “in vivo” decision
making, with much more emphasis on seeking to understand processes
in ontologically uncertain contexts that are relevant to policy making.
This implies a focus on non-routine rather than on routine decisions,
long-term rather than short-term decisions, complex rather than simple
Tuckett et al. • Uncertainty, Decision Science, and Policy Making 11
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decisions, and decisions made in teams rather than by isolated
individuals.
2. Theories should be supported by studies that take account of a much
wider range of relevant human capacities obviously available to the
agents who make decisions, such as feeling, imagining, interpreting,
co-operating, and imitating, not just calculating.
3. Theories should be based on studies that go beyond one-shot
decisions to examine processes of managing decision making over
time. We need to explore the influence of the social and psycholo-
gical processes that enable decision makers to gain support for
decisions made under uncertainty, when psychological and social
pressures may make it difficult to take any long-term decisions at all,
and to examine how they monitor the outcome of what they are
deciding and adjust and learn from experience. This would include
attending to the unintended outcomes of decisions; for example, by
studying the effects of regulatory actions in finance or the economy
and comparing them to intentions.
4. Theories should take account of the wider decision-making context,
in particular the ways decisions are embedded in social practices, how
formal and informal institutional processes shape decisions, and how
multiple actors and their decisions are interdependent. This would
include investigating the facilitating tropes and images that various
actors bring to bear in their practical engagements with complex
circumstances.8
Research that embraces such features will need to be genuinely
interdisciplinary (covering perspectives from economics, social and brain
sciences such as social and cognitive psychology, neuroscience, linguist-
ics, psychoanalysis, and even literature and poetry) and will need to study
how decisions are actually made. With this kind of effort we could
expect to build new reality-based theories of decision making that are
useful in understanding the consequences of different ways of making
decisions that matter.
In what follows, we highlight a few ongoing research projects that, in
our view, exemplify new reality-based theories of decision making. The
first of these examples shows the advantage of considering the context in
which decisions are made. The second illustrates what might be
accomplished by operationalizing a theory designed for a context of
ontological uncertainty populated by more broadly conceived human
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social actors. The third shows the potential benefit of re-examining
traditional quantitative/qualitative research boundaries, while the fourth
puts quantitative efforts to anticipate the uncertain future alongside those
used in scenario development.
The Pragmatic “Adaptive Toolbox” Approach
The “pragmatic“ adaptive-toolbox approach to decision making, being
developed at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in
Berlin (see Gigerenzer et al. 1999), looks at decision making in its
particular context. Rather than making generalizations about decisions
based on the features of one type of decision made in one time and place,
this approach examines the match between a particular heuristic (i.e., a
simple mental shortcut or rule of thumb) that one uses in order to make
a decision (e.g., decide based on just one reason) and the environment or
“ecology” in which it works. It thus focuses on “ecological rationality”
rather than the context-free formal logical rationality championed in
economics. The outcome is an experimentally and analytically supported
account of which tools work best in which specific circumstances.
The pragmatic approach empowers actors to identify and use what
they already know insofar as it works in their context. Its research base is
an extensive set of empirical findings describing how people make
decisions, not only in the laboratory but also in the field (e.g., how
consumers choose which electricity carrier to use; Pichert and Katsiko-
poulos 2008). It also relies on a set of analytical findings showing how
various heuristic tools work very well in various specific contexts but not
in others.9 In short, the story told in the pragmatic approach is that
people use heuristics and that in many settings this is reasonable since
they perform quite adequately—better, in fact, than standard decision-
theoretic models such as linear models, Bayesian networks, classification
and regression trees, etc.
In a variety of complex decision-making situations pragmatic
approaches, using “one-reason” heuristics, have been shown to work
better than idealistic solutions.10 In medical clinics, for example, doctors
must use “decision trees” to choose a diagnosis from among several
options and determine which treatment is suitable. Deploying idealistic
approaches, Bayes’s rule can be represented as a tree with 2m branches,
where m is the number of binary cues or attributes (e.g., whether a
medical test, such as a mammography, indicates a disease or not). Yet
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when the number of cues grows, a Bayesian approach becomes
computationally intractable or fraught with estimation error because
one typically has too few data points for the thousands of branches of
such a gigantic tree.
In contrast, a fast-and-frugal tree has only (m + 1) branches and thus is
likely to be more robust. It has the following building blocks (Martignon
et al. 2008; for an example, see Figure 1 below):
1. A searching rule: Search through cues in a predetermined order.
2. A stopping rule: Stop search as soon as a cue leads to an exit (i.e., allows a
classification to be made).
3. A decision rule: Classify the object accordingly.
Fast-and-frugal trees are used successfully by experts in many fields, from
cancer screening to making decisions about whether to allow a defendant
to post bail. Laura Martignon and colleagues (2008) tested the accuracy
of fast-and-frugal trees in 30 classification problems ranging from fields
such as medicine and sports to economics. They reported that complex
benchmark strategies, including logistic regression, excelled at data
fitting, but fast-and-frugal trees were close or identical to these strategies
in their predictive accuracy.
A specific example is emergency medicine. When patients arrive at
the hospital with severe chest pain, emergency physicians have to decide
Figure 1. Fast-and-Frugal Tree for Categorizing Patients’ Risk of
Having Ischemic Heart Disease
Source: Adapted from Green and Mehr 1997.
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quickly whether they suffer from acute ischemic heart disease and should
be assigned to the intensive coronary care unit (ICU). In a Michigan
hospital, doctors preferred to err on what they believed was the safe side
by sending about 90 percent of the patients to the ICU, although only 25
percent of these actually had a myocardial infarction (Green and Mehr
1997). The result was an overly crowded ICU, lower quality of care,
higher cost, and a risk of serious infection among those who were
incorrectly assigned. Green and Mehr (1997) tried two solutions: (a) a
logistic regression, the Heart Disease Predictive Instrument, and (b) a
fast-and-frugal tree. To use the Heart Disease Predictive Instrument,
doctors received a chart with some 50 probabilities, checked the presence
and absence of symptoms, and inserted the relevant probabilities into a
pocket calculator. The fast-and-frugal tree ignored all probabilities and
asked only a few yes-or-no questions. Ultimately, the tree was more
accurate in predicting actual heart attacks than was the Heart Disease
Predictive Instrument: It sent fewer patients who suffered from a heart
attack wrongly into a regular bed and also nearly halved physicians’ high
false-alarm rate. Last but not least, the tree was transparent, easy to
memorize, and easy to modify, and was accepted by physicians who
disliked relying on a logistic regression they barely understood. The tree
is presented in Figure 1.
More recently, fast and frugal trees have also been applied to the
domain of financial regulation (Aikman et al. 2014). Using a dataset of
116 global banks, which had $100 billion in assets at the end of 2006, fast
and frugal trees, and the logistic regressions typically used in such analyses
in finance, were employed in order to predict which of 43 banks failed
(i.e., went bankrupt or had to be bailed out) during the crisis. A main
result is that the performance of the two classes of algorithms was
comparable, with the fast and frugal trees performing overall better under
the more realistic condition of fewer economic indicators of high
reliability being available.
Insofar as these new pragmatic approaches clearly have value, we need to
understand why the idealistic culture has been so dominant and remains so
attractive and so resistant to change despite its impracticality and its relative
lack of empirical support (Katsikopoulos 2014). Perhaps approaches that
draw on shortcuts, narratives, and emotions tend to be stigmatized in the
academic community. They are undoubtedly depicted as less scientific, less
elegant, and more irrational than more quantitative “rational-scientific”
approaches. Furthermore, in contrast to pragmatic approaches, which offer
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reactive solutions to immediate problems, rational-scientific models
maintain the illusion of agents’ near omniscience.
The Conviction Narrative Approach
Conviction Narrative Theory (CNT) (Chong and Tuckett 2014;
Tuckett et al. 2014a) is another attempt to operationalize a new theory
of decision making, drawing on ideas developing in the fields of narrative
and embodied cognition. It asks how, if people cannot be sure if the
outcome of what they decide is gain or loss, they manage to commit to
action. Decisions of the kind policy makers attempt will, of course, turn
out to be successful or not, but that is not known in advance. To make
decisions people have to interpret the facts they search out, to imagine
how things will turn out for them, and to feel convinced about their
conclusions. Keeping control of “the narrative” defining what is or not
success may also be important in any eventual evaluation.
Specifically, CNT draws on what we are coming to know about the
role played by emotion in facilitating action. In this approach,
interpretations about the world and its future evolution are conceived
as constituted through embodied narratives (Wojciehowski and Gallese
2011), which create good (satisfying = approach) or bad (frustrating =
avoid) feelings registered in psychological and brain systems. Emotions
related to the category of approach (“excitement about gain”) will lead
agents to embrace projects; emotions related to the category of avoid
(“anxiety about loss”) will lead to aversion. To act requires that
explanations and arguments be available to repel anxiety.
CNT provides a research opportunity now that many decisions are
reported in digital texts and large amounts of text can be processed very
rapidly. Narratives about particular topics (e.g., housing) or locations
(e.g., the United States) will often contain words that are well established
in sociolinguistics to evoke the emotions of excitement about gain and
anxiety about loss. The prediction is that shifts taking place through time
in the relationship between these two types of words in a relevant body
of narratives will mark underlying shifts through time in interpretations
of the world. A financial bubble, for example, will be accompanied by a
growing and disproportionate level of excitement words relative to
anxiety words in relevant narratives (about dotcoms, mortgages, etc.),
which will then “correct” when the bubble bursts. Over a whole
economy a shift in the direction of more anxiety words relative to
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excitement words could indicate an underlying move towards less
confidence played out shortly in a downward movement in GDP.
Over a fifteen-month period, a team at University College London
used this cross-disciplinary theory of decision making under uncertainty
to create a prototype analytic method called Directed Algorithmic Text
Analysis (DATA) (Tuckett et al. 2014b; Tuckett et al. 2015). DATA
extracts information about highly specific changes in expressed emotions
in the narratives collected in digital text archives. The prototype creates
what is called a relative sentiment shift (RSS) time series. This calculates
changes, in any text database across time, in the number of words related
to the category of excitement relative to the number of words in the
category of anxiety, adjusting for the number of words in the articles, etc.
Results suggest that this form of analysis has strong potential for
improving our understanding of what is happening in the economy
and where policy action might be required.
One digital data source is the Reuters News Archive, which spans
1996 to 2013 and contains over 14 million text documents. Figure 2
shows a relative sentiment shift time series generated from all texts
originating in the United States (dashed curve) plotted against US GDP
(solid curve). The sharp drop in GDP in the recession of 2008-9 is
evident. It is equally evident that relative sentiment series begins to fall
well in advance of the decline in GDP. The decline in GDP began in the
second quarter of 2008 and was not predicted by conventional
economists at the time. Indeed, consensus economic forecasts were still
showing positive growth well into 2009. RSS series developed over
several text databases consistently function as leading indicators of
changes in both GDP and indices of uncertainty (Nyman et al. 2014;
Nyman and Ormerod 2014; Tuckett et al. 2015). (In more formal terms,
RSS series reflect Granger causality.)
What might explain these results?
The forecasting accuracy of the current, idealistically based economic
models has long been recognized as poor, especially at what prove to be
turning points—precisely when they are needed the most (Fildes and
Stekler 2002; Zarnowitz and Braun 1992). The inability to predict the
recent crisis is but the latest example (Bank of England 2008, 367, chart 8).
We think the prototype RSS analysis is a useful indicator of what is
happening in an economy because it is based on a wider conception of
economic agents, who are viewed as constructing embodied narratives of
conviction on which to base their actions. Specifically, it captures shifts
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between two key groups of emotions that are important in the narratives
people construct in order to act in situations of uncertainty. To act we
need to feel convinced that we are making the best available decision. Our
emotions often feel persuasive to us and often seem to us to be good guides
to action because they are part of a larger narrative. For example, we might
feel anxious if we think we may be in a dangerous situation. In this sense
emotions, which are generally intertwined with particular (perhaps
implicit) narratives, are the basis of actions. Therefore, an unusual shift
from one category of emotion to the other may indicate that the basis on
which action is being taken—the narrative undergirding the emotion—is
also changing.
Thus, Conviction Narrative Theory does not treat thinking and
feeling as opposed categories. Following developments in sociology,
anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience, it recognizes that cognition
and emotion are mutually supportive in permitting someone to act. In
this approach, people perceive the world by constructing and refuting
narratives that concern social relationships. People make sense of their
observations by constructing narratives, and the narratives also help direct
their attention. Narratives that “feel” right, perhaps because they make
Figure 2. Quarterly percentage changes in U.S. Real GDP and Relative
Sentiment Shifts in Reuters U.S.-Based News Articles
Source: Thomson Reuters News Archive
The solid line is the quarterly percentage change in real U.S. GDP. The dashed
line is the relative sentiment series. Both series are normalized for purposes of
comparison.
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sense of the world, are strong determinants of economic action.
Conviction Narrative Theory and DATA are thus attempts to oper-
ationalize a non-idealistic approach to understanding the aggregate
outcomes of actions that together make up a variable, for example, GDP.
Two features of the prototype RSS measures developed to date are
particularly important for forecasting. First, analyses of even very large
textual databases can be performed quickly, in not more than a few
hours, enabling them to be used as leading indicators for economic time
series in a subsequent period. Second, unlike many economic time series,
the RSS is not subject to revisions. The Reuters newsfeed text database
in any given month, for example, contains articles that are not revisited
and revised; nor are additional articles later added to it.
New Social Science
Policy analysis seeks to understand how to influence individuals in
society. The analytical distinction between micro interactions and macro
structure has inspired thinking about society ever since Durkheim (1912)
defined social facts as sui generis. Tomasso Venturini and Bruno Latour
(2010) have recently been studying the micro/macro distinction in the
light of the large number of digital traces people leave when they cross
borders, use their credit cards, meet each other, search the Internet,
tweet, and so on. By following these traces we can see social groups
forming and dissolving and barriers opening and closing.
Before the advent of digital traces, social scientists often had to choose
between quantitative methods (monitoring large populations, but with
only superficial insights) and qualitative methods (offering rich informa-
tion, but only on small populations). Little by little, this methodological
discontinuity trenched a theoretical divide between theories of micro
interactions (supposedly local and subjective) and macro structures
(supposedly global and objective). Instead of questioning this divide,
idealistic models have proposed a number of ingenious (but unrealistic)
ways to simulate the emergence of the global from the local; in
economics this produced the “representative agent” of DSGE models.
According to Latour et al. (2012, 590), the traceability of digital media
has transformed this situation, finally providing the data necessary to
follow with continuity the weaving of collective life. “Once we have the
experience of following individuals through their connections it might
be more rewarding to begin navigating datasets without making the
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distinction between the level of individual component and that of
aggregated structure.” Digital traces offer us the ability to observe social
phenomena in the making, thus erasing the hard-and-fast distinction
between the individual and collective levels.
Digital tools allow us to conceive of society as formed by overlapping
monads—a concept introduced into sociology by Gabriel Tarde (1893)
and defined by Latour et al. (2012, 598) as “not a part of a whole, but a
point of view on all the other entities taken severally and not as a
totality.” This approach might make it possible to develop different types
of social science that emphasize that individual and collective actors are
the result, not the premise, of social interactions. One illustration of the
qualities of this quali-quantitative approach is the project La Fabrique de la
Loi (“The Law Factory”).11 This project is meant to help citizens follow
how French laws are transformed by parliamentary discussion. The
current online platform contains data on about 300 proposed laws. It
allows one to compare how much time each proposal occupied in the
different sections of the parliament; to explore how each article of each
law has been modified at each stage; to learn which amendments were
proposed by different political groups; and to read the transcripts of
parliamentary speeches on specific articles at specific stages of the
discussion. Through these functions (and others), the platform
encourages its users to navigate the datascape of the parliamentary
discussion, zooming out to compare hundreds of laws’ texts and zooming
in to read verbatim transcripts of single discussions. One can thus observe
both the structures of the French juridical system and the individual
interactions in the parliament, which shows how the collective and
individual levels are just two extremes of a seamless collective movement
through which the law is constructed.
La Fabrique de la Loi is just one project that allows us to see the
continuity of social existence. The same continuity has been illustrated
by studies of how memes spread (Leskovec et al. 2009);12 fame in the
blogosphere (Cardon et al. 2011); migrant communities (Crush et al.
2012, 345);13 manga styles (Manovitch 2012); scientific paradigms
(Chavalarias and Cointent 2009; Börner 2010); open-source collabora-
tion (Heller et al. 2011); international negotiations (Venturini et al.
2014); lexical trends in the history of literature (Michel et al. 2011); and
Wikipedia controversies (Borra et al. 2014, 34).14 All of these projects
show how the continuum between local exchanges and global trends
revealed by the advent of digital traces is much more interesting and rich
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than are its extremes. Social existence does not jump from micro to
macro and neither should social sciences.
Foresight
Policy makers have to try to foresee the future, in part to figure out how
it might be affected by a given policy. The activity of “foreseeing” or of
creating “anticipatory knowledge” is challenging in many domains and
can be seen in different ways (Selin 2008). For example, is the problem a
deficit of knowledge about the future or is it a matter of irreducible
uncertainty (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993)? If the former, will a
combination of better data and enhanced modeling enable effective
change, or do new approaches need to be designed for managing societal
transformation (as opposed to being designed for mere incremental
change)? If the latter, how can policy makers and scholars determine the
rigor and robustness of foresight about an issue or problem when they
cannot yet access the facts of the future?
Foresight is an organized process of thinking about the future. Over
the past sixty years the search for ways to appreciate, understand, and
navigate complex challenges and future uncertainties has generated a
diverse range of approaches to foresight. They reflect the different
purposes and situations in which such practices are effectively deployed
and they use a diversity of methods. These include computer-based
modeling and simulation, forecasting, back-casting, visioning, scenario
planning, horizon scanning, Delphi techniques, search conferences, etc.
Each method is elaborated through a variety of techniques. Regardless of
the method used, foresight practitioners recognize that before decision
making, there is an important process of judgment: how the problem or
situation is framed and by whom.
Under the idealized influences we have been discussing, in recent
decades foresight thinking and practice have been threatened by the rise
of quantitative forecasting and prediction, which have crowded out the
alternative approaches represented by open-futures thinking and narrat-
ive-based inquiry. Quantitative forecasting uses historical data in the
form of time series to suggest possible futures based on past patterns.
Models based on idealized assumptions use statistical relationships derived
from past data to extrapolate patterns from it (Montgomery et al. 2008),
in some instances in the form of a fan diagram. The suppressed but
familiar assumption is that the dynamics that produced the past will also
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produce the future. Joined to this assumption is the further implication
that the future is closed and that there is little scope to shape it through
human agency.
In contrast (perhaps in addition) to this type of quantitative
forecasting, policy makers can use the activity termed “foresight” to see
the future as the uncertain outcome of a playing field of power in which
policies are strategically framed. One framing technique is the creation of
plausibility-based scenarios, which offer an alternative approach to
forecasting and policy choice that helps groups and organizations engage
with unpredictability and uncertainty and cope with what we do not and
cannot know (Wilkinson et al. 2013). For example, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is using the plaus-
ible-scenario approach to rethink the future of higher education (OECD
2009a), the future of international migration to OECD countries
(OECD 2009b), and the future of pension incomes (OECD 2013) while
the British government is using scenarios to anticipate how to address
public-health issues, such as obesity (Butland 2007). While foresight
exercises help us with the vital task of keeping open the potential for
uncertainty in decision- and policy-making processes, it is particularly
challenging to do so if those involved fail to recognize the limitations of
the apparently more precise idealistic models.
In the approach to foresight termed “open futures thinking” and
“narrative-based inquiry,” the challenge is not better prediction of the
future, so to speak, but the production or shaping of a world created by
reflexivity (Beck et al. 1994), i.e., an enactment of the notion that “the
situations that men define as true, become true for them” (Thomas and
Thomas 1928, 572). Action is part of a whole process of creating,
revealing, and testing deeply held assumptions (including mindsets,
worldviews, and paradigms), managing disagreement (which is more
often an asset than a disadvantage), and identifying more and better
options. In essence, this new type of foresight recognizes the future as
fiction in the making rather than as established fact.
III. POTENTIAL, RISKS, THEORIES, AND POLICIES
A salient feature of two of the projects introduced above is that they take
advantage of the analytic potential of digital data. Thus they build on the
fact that an exponentially growing share of social activities is recorded
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digitally and automatically in a form that is much easier to analyze than
hitherto. Whereas once investigators would need to laboriously search
through archives, conduct interviews, and make observations that often
had all kinds of sampling problems, the advent of digital “Big Data” is an
opportunity for more-comprehensive and less-onerous research. Digital
data-intensive research can be used for generating, refining, and assessing
hypotheses about complex systems in a rapid, iterative manner—thereby
supporting exploration and complementing and facilitating more tradi-
tional scientific processes of hypothesis generation and experimental
testing to provide strong causal inferences. The digital revolution creates
new and more varied data (quantitative; qualitative; sentiment; micro;
macro; etc.), enhances the scope for large-scale simulation and testing,
and may enable early warnings and the fine-tuning and monitoring of
actions or policies.
However, there are also perils. In particular, Big Data creates the
possibility of finding a large number of spurious, artificial correlations,
which, from the perspective of frequentist statistical theory, may appear,
on conventional criteria, to be significant. If we do not posit theories
before we haphazardly sift through the data, we may “find” hypotheses
post hoc, but we then have no way of testing them since the process of
finding them was the only available test. Finding a significant result that
was not hypothesized before should be the beginning of a new effort,
not the end of a previous lucky one. Big-Data researchers must also to do
more than try to improve the probability of decision outcomes; they
should also attempt to uncover deeply held interpretive frames and test
the quality of interpreters’ judgments. Finally, although this is a much
larger subject than we can treat adequately here, we need to be very
cautious when using machine learning techniques to analyze, understand,
and model human choices using Big Data. The defining characteristics of
Big Data are its volume, variety, and velocity. Machines can analyze large
volumes of data and identify trends and apparent relationships very
rapidly. But the techniques that allow for such high-speed analysis of
great data volumes are often precisely those we have been questioning:
optimization techniques based on pre-specified models (for instance,
those with assumed normality of random variations), which are valid
only insofar as the phenomena being analyzed are predictable rather than
deeply uncertain. The danger is that superior machine capacities for rapid
calculation and optimum selection are mistaken as superior to or
reflective of human choice processes.
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This is especially so if one thinks, as at least implicitly many behavioral
economists do, that decision making goes awry because the human mind
is distracted rather than assisted by emotions, sensations—the mind inside
the mind. All too often an implicit and unrecognized aim of behavioral
economics is to make human decision-making more like machine
decision-making, which work well only when the problem is well
defined. As we have been contending, many situations—particularly
those involving uncertainty—are just not like that. But given the
intractability of human “biases,” it is all the more tempting to turn to
machines rather than attempting to make machines more like people.
Overcoming Idealistic Modeling
Idealistic models, with their apparent ability to provide numbers and
solutions, have great powers of recovery. Although Herbert Simon’s
seminal paper on behavioral economics, written in 1955, argued that
heuristics both gave “satisfactory” outcomes and were actually used in most
situations, the effect of his paper on economic thinking was minimal.
Introducing his notion of “bounded rationality,” he declared that “the task
is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational
behavior which is compatible with the access to information and
computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including
man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist” (Simon
1955, 99). Although Simon’s work led eventually to the development of
both experimental and behavioral economics, the concept of bounded
rationality was absorbed by the economics mainstream, which defanged it
by transforming it into “optimization under computational constraints.”
Frank Knight’s, J. M. Keynes’s, and G.L.S. Shackle’s arguments for the
importance of uncertainty suffered similar fates. However, with the
increasing awareness of the importance of “black swans” (e.g., Taleb
2010), economists and others are now paying more attention to the nature
of uncertainty.
One explanation for this change is that theories informed by rational-
scientific methodologies achieve credibility when underpinned by
confident narratives about progress; that is, when convincing visions of
future success seem to guarantee strategic grasps of complex fields.
However, when (as now) the sense of progress begins to wear thin,
people become more interested in detailed ethnographic observation of
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the cognitive and emotional processes driving reactive decision making
(in finance or policy making, for example) (see Abolafia 1996).
Another way of thinking about the difficulties of changing idealist
economic thinking is to recall that there is sunk human capital—financial
and emotional—in the status quo. There is a massive investment in
appearing to “know” and in idealistic approaches to knowing. Unlearning
and facing how uncertain things are is hard and is thus a significant barrier to
change. But it will never happen if we do not think about the limitations of
existing approaches and recognize that there might be alternatives.
NOTES
1. This paper summarizes some of the main lines of discussion from a meeting in
Florence that brought together physicists, computer scientists, psychologists, anthro-
pologists, mathematicians, sociologists, economists, climate scientists, practitioners,
and policy makers. We discussed decision-making processes, how “idealized”
modeling prevents an adequate understanding of these processes, and alternative
methodologies for a new understanding of them. Themeetingwas funded by the EU
FP7 Co-ordination Action grant 266723 Global System Dynamics and Policy
(GSDP), whose support is gratefully acknowledged. David Tuckett also wishes to
acknowledge support from the Institute of New Economic Thinking (grant no.
IN01100025) and the Anna Freud Centre. A follow-up meeting was generously
aided by the University Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne and the EU Co-ordination
Action grant 296777 NonEquilibrium Social Science (NESS)
2. Power and politics may affect which theories gain acceptance, but such a
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. These days, “neoclassical” economics is taken to be synonymous with
“mainstream” economics.
4. See, for example, Ormerod 2012.
5. The formal articulation of general-equilibrium theory is highly mathematical,
but for those interested a classic reference is Arrow and Hahn 1971, devastatingly
criticized by Kirman 1989.
6. For a useful survey, see Tovar 2009.
7. See, for instance, Klein 1993; Bruner 1986 and 1990; Weick, Sutcliffe, and
Obstfield 2005; Beach 2010.
8. A good example is the image of “the edge” (see Lyng 1990 and 2005) that risk-
takers often crystallize in the course of their uncertain practices. The device of
the edge partitions complexity into imagined spheres of greater or lesser rational
controllability, helping actors distribute their decision making (rational and
intuitive) according to the relative proximity of the edge.
9. For a review of research on heuristics, see Gigerenzer, Hertwig, and
Pachur 2011.
10. For a review, see Katsikopoulos 2011.
11. See http://www.lafabriquedelaloi.fr/
12. See memetracker.org
13. See e-diasporas.fr
14. See contropedia.net
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